Abstract. Several different definitions of quantum games have been proposed over the past five years. Some of the results claimed for the differences between these quantum games and classical games identified as those to which they correspond have been criticized, however, as not being fair comparisons. In this paper I define classical and quantum versions of games with mediated communication, and propose that these are the classical and quantum games that should be compared.
CLASSICAL GAME THEORY
In a 2-player game each player i has a set of (pure) strategies S (i) , i ∈ {1, 2}, and a payoff function: (2) → R that defines the outcome for each player, given a pair of strategies describing the play of both players. Each player's goal is to maximize his payoff (or the expectation value of his payoff in non-deterministic settings). Consider, for example, the two-player game CHICKEN, in which the players drive cars head-on at one another. Swerving to the right is the "Chicken" (C) strategy; not swerving is the "Dare" (D) strategy [17] . Writing the payoff functions on S (1) × S (2) 
That is, if one player plays C while the other plays D, their payoffs are 1 and 5, respectively. If they both play C, each payoff is 4; and if they both play D, each payoff is 0.
Given this information about a game, the goal of game theory is to 'solve' the game, i.e., to predict how the players will play. The simplest solution concept is a Nash equilibrium: a set of strategies, one for each player, such that neither player can improve his (expected) payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy [18, 19] . For CHICKEN, it is easy to check that (C, D) and (D,C) are Nash equilibria, with payoffs (1, 5) and (5, 1), respectively. This concept extends from pure strategies to mixed strategies, i.e., probability distributions over pure strategies. The pure strategies C and D label a basis for the vector space implied by the notation of (1); in this vector space a mixed strategy for either player is a nonnegative vector with L 1 -norm 1. The pair of mixed strategies p (1) (2) in this notation is also a Nash equilibrium. In this case the players' expected payoffs are
Since there is not a unique Nash equilibrium for CHICKEN, and because (C,C) is a symmetric pair of strategies with payoff for each player greater than in (2), it is not a completely satisfactory solution concept for this game.
There are other solution concepts, however, that account for the possible existence of pre-play communication or external institutions. A game with mediated (classical ) communication is specified by including a commonly known probability distribution µ : S → R and an external referee who samples it and recommends privately to each player i the pure strategy in the i th component of the sample. If neither player can improve his expected payoff by unilaterally not following the referee's recommendation, the probability distribution is a correlated equilibrium of the original game [20] . To express this in a way that will most clearly generalize to the quantum mechanical situation, for each player i, let R (i) denote the set of maps R = R (1) × R (2) : S → S for which R ( j) = id if j = i. These are player i's unilateral deviations from following the referee's recommendation. Then µ is a correlated equilibrium if for each player i,
The joint probability distribution µ can be a product distribution: µ = p (1) p (2) ; if it is also a correlated equilibrium it is necessarily a Nash equilibrium. More generally, the set of all correlated equilibria is compact and convex. The convex hull of the Nash equilibria is a subset of the set of correlated equilibria [21] , and there can be correlated equilibria outside the convex hull of the Nash equilibria [20] . For example, in CHICKEN the correlated equilibrium with the largest total expected payoff, ( 
QUANTUM INFORMATION IN GAMES
From the point of view of information theory, in a game with mediated (classical) communication the referee draws a sample from S according to the probability distribution µ and sends to each player i the signal s i , denoting the S (i) component of the sample. After acting, each player i returns R (i) (s i ) and then the referee evaluates the payoffs using the returned signals. The probability distribution on S resulting from the players' responses is
Describing a game with mediated (classical) communication this way suggests an immediate quantum analogue. Define a game with mediated quantum communication to be the following scenario: The referee prepares a quantum state ψ ∈ C S (1) ⊗ C S (2) and sends to each player i the quantum signal instantiated by the subsystem described by the i th tensor factor. Then each player i acts on his own subsystem and returns it to the referee. Finally, the referee measures the whole system in the basis labelled by S, and computes the payoffs using the observed element of S.
If the players only act by unitary operations U (i) , the state the referee measures is
More generally, the players should really be allowed to make any quantum operation on their subsystem, i.e., player i's action is described by some trace preserving completely positive map on the reduced density matrix ρ (i) of his subsystem. This can transform the initial state ρ = ψ ⊗ ψ † into a mixed state ρ . Thus, in general, the expected payoff for player i is:
Within this scenario, define a quantum correlated equilibrium for a game to be an initial state ψ which gives neither player an incentive to act unilaterally by anything other than the identity operator. Let A (i) denote the set of maps
is a completely positive trace preserving map on C S ( j) ⊗ (C S ( j) ) * and A ( j) = I if j = i. Again, these should be interpreted as player i's possible unilateral deviations from the referee's recommendation. Then ψ is a quantum correlated equilibrium if for each player i,
PROPERTIES OF QUANTUM CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA
The most basic, and perhaps surprising, property of quantum correlated equilibria is that if ψ is quantum correlated equilibrium for a game then the probability distribution defined by µ s = |ψ s | 2 is a classical correlated equilibrium for the same game. To see this, notice that by construction, the expectation value of the payoff for each player is the same for ψ and µ. A (i) includes the quantum operation where player i measures his subsystem to obtain |s i , for s i ∈ S i , and then transforms the subsystem into |R (i) (s i ) for any R (i) : S i → S i , while the other player acts only by the identity.
By (4), this reduces the expectation value of player i's payoff. But the probability distributions over S created by these quantum operations are the same as those on the right hand side of (3). Thus (3) holds, and µ is a (classical) correlated equilibrium. This means that any set of payoffs achieved in a quantum correlated equilibrium can also be achieved classically. But it does not imply that classical and quantum correlated equilibria are equivalent solution concepts. Since there are many other quantum operations than those used in the argument in the preceding paragraph, (4) is a larger set of constraints than (3), and generically has fewer solutions. In fact, one might worry that there are no quantum correlated equilibria at all. But (4) does have solutions: Consider a quantum state ψ such that ψ s 1 s 2 = p (1)
is the probability distribution for a Nash equilibrium. ψ is thus a product state ψ (1) ⊗ ψ (2) , so any quantum operation by player 1, for example, leaves it in a product state ρ = (ρ (1) ) ⊗ ρ (2) , where ρ (2) = ψ (2) ⊗ ψ (2) † . But this state implies a probability distribution ρ ss = (ρ (1) 
. Only the probability distribution on player 1's strategies has changed, so since µ is a Nash equilibrium, ρ cannot improve player 1's expected payoff. Thus quantum correlated equilibria exist for any game with mediated quantum communication: they are Nash equilibria for the same game without communication.
Not every classical correlated equilibrium for a game, however, even in the convex hull of the Nash equilibria, can be realized as |ψ s | 2 for some quantum correlated equilibrium of the same game. This can be shown by calculation in a specific example, and more detailed calculations are necessary to characterize completely the set of quantum correlated equilibria [22] .
DISCUSSION
I have formulated the quantum analogue of correlated equilibria in a game with mediated classical communication, having been led there by an information theoretic interpretation of the latter. These are equilibria of the same game, but with mediated quantum communication. Although Marinatto and Weber have defined quantum games [23] in a way that is structurally equivalent-what they term an "entangled quantum strategy" is exactly an entangled state prepared by the referee here-they do not allow arbitrary quantum operations by the players, which leads them to unrealistic conclusions about the difference from the classical game. The quantum communication perspective presented here clarifies exactly what is quantum mechanical about the game, and the classical scenario to which it should be compared. The absence of any fair comparison between quantum and classical games has been emphasized by van Enk and Pike [24] ; this work is partially motivated by their critique.
What Marinatto and Weber call an "entangled quantum strategy" was first introduced by Eisert, Wilkens and Lewenstein [25] in a scenario that corresponds in our formalism to the referee making the final measurement in a (specific) different basis of the joint Hilbert space. This is a generalization that deserves investigation-in the game with mediated classical communication it corresponds to further processing of the players' actions after they accept or reject the referee's recommendation. This might be something as simple as a coin flip to decide a tie, or as subtle as the change in the bid of the high bidder in a second price auction. In any case, it is again the game with mediated classical communication to which the quantum game of Eisert, Wilkens and Lewenstein should be compared for any differences, not the classical game alone.
